

# On the Logos of Heraclitus

Akiko Kimura

## Introduction

*"Panta rhei (πάντα ρει)*—all things flow." This statement characterizes Heraclitus' doctrine. His philosophical influence was reached Democritus and Plato, the founder of the Stoic school. Heraclitus was born in Ephesus, which in those days was the center of the Ionian Kingdom, but the details of his life is unknown. His philosophical work was probably completed by 480 B.C. In temperament and character Heraclitus was said to have been gloomy, indifferent and stubborn. His famous epithet was "The Dark." Diogenes calls Heraclitus a hater of mankind and stated that Heraclitus lived in the mountains because of this character. He further stated that the diet which Heraclitus was on included such things as grass and roots and that it was the cause of his death. Some people thought Heraclitus was a pessimist, but he was never a pessimist because a pessimist would say that there is more evil in the world than good, or that the evil is somehow more fundamental or more real. But this was not the position of Heraclitus. His doctrine is rather that good and evil are two sides of the same reality, as are up and down, beauty and ugliness, life and death.

The obscurity of his style is very famous. He liked paradox and isolated aphorisms, expressed in metaphorical or symbolic terms. This was already remarked upon by Aristotle. He was given the title of "The Riddler" by Timon of Philius early in 3 B.C. The hidden and symbolic style of his sayings is undoubtedly in part due to the contempt that he felt for most of those who were likely to

see his work, since the truth of his writings was lost for those who were ignorant of his style. But there is another side. According to Diogenes, "occasionally in his treatise he fires off something brilliant clarity, such that even the dullest can easily grasp and experience an elevation of spirit; and the brevity and weight of his expression are incomparable."<sup>1</sup> Also, Heraclitus had a prophetic character. Many things in the fragments suggest the religious rather than the philosophic teacher. For instance, his combination of pride and humility defers to the deity as he states, "Listen not to me but to the logos." (Fr.50)<sup>2</sup>

Actually his expression of the thought is so obscure, subtle, symbolical and paradoxical that no two commentators agree on a same understanding of his works. Moreover, there are doubts confined to the clarity of a given body of his writings. Diels-Kranz presents 131 passages as fragments, which most scholars accept. It is a matter of argument how much of his works are authentic and how much is paraphrased or added to by ancient writers. There may have been so many translators paraphrasing his works that there is doubt too much of its grammatical syntax. This is an inevitable consequence of Heraclitus' oracular style. The common assumption of recent scholars is that philosophers and others from Plato and Aristotle must be judged guilty unless they can prove their innocence with regards to their understanding of Heraclitus. This assumption rests on an impressive account of study on their outlook and the questions in their mind, which were inevitably different from the habits of mind and problems of earlier and less sophisticated thinkers. The Aristotelian outlook imposed itself and made certain claims as almost second nature. In the case of Heraclitus we have further

complications that some of his ideas were adopted and rephrased by the Stoics, so that in later sources there is always the possibility of Stoic coloring coming into an original thought.

In this paper, I will focus on the topic of “logos,” especially the meaning of logos, the nature of logos, and the relation between logos and fire.

### **The meaning of Logos**

The word of logos has many meanings: saying, speech, discourse, statement, report, account, explanation, reason, principle, esteem, reputation, collection, enumeration, ratio, proportion, etc. In the usual Ionian prose, logos means “report” and “discourse.” For example, a work of Hecataeus began with the following words: “For the reports (logoi) of the Greeks are, in my judgment, many and ridiculous.”<sup>3</sup> The fifth-century treatise of Ion of Chios also begins: “The starting point of my discourse (logos): all things are three, and nothing more or less than these.”<sup>4</sup> Such usage of logos is often shown in other treatises. Also, there is logos as “financial account, reckoning,” derived from *λογίζεσθαι* “count, reckon” and *λογισμός* “calculation.”<sup>5</sup> *Λόγοι* (logoi) occur as “stories,” “talk,” throughout the sixth and fifth century. Hence logos is linked to a particular content. Its main function is to disclose it and to present the matter so that it be understood.<sup>6</sup> So it can explain a situation or a fact, tell a story, report an event, or communicate an idea, the connotations of “consideration, deliberation, argument.” A logos is the exposition of a particular topic, and hence it has a specific and definite character.<sup>7</sup> When we consider if it is an account of finances or of one of the situation, one has to find out how things are. So logos does not

mean just the actual exposition of one's account in speech, but also need the process of thinking by which it is achieved and which of course is displayed.<sup>8</sup>

Then, how is the usage of Heraclitus? He also uses the word of *logos* many times. "Logos" appears ten times in nine different fragments. It may be thought that the usage of Heraclitus is not the original one and that he also followed the traditional usage. However, when we see his prose, Heraclitus seems to use the words in his paradoxical and equivocal way.<sup>9</sup> It is very difficult to decide which meaning he intends. In the very beginning, "logos" appears as follows:

Although this account (*λόγῳ*) holds forever, men ever fail to comprehend, both before hearing it and once they have heard. Although all things come to pass in accordance with this account (*λόγῳ*), men are like the untried when they try such words and works as I set forth, distinguishing each according to its nature and telling how it is. But other men are oblivious of what they do awake, just as they are forgetful of what they do asleep.<sup>10</sup>

Here Guthrie cited "measure," "correspondence, relation," or "proportion," as the sense of "logos."<sup>11</sup> Diels and Kranz translate this word as "Sinn," and they usually take this meaning as "what he says." Likewise, Jonathan Barnes holds that a *logos* or 'account' is what a man *legei* or says. Burnet admits the view that Heraclitus uses "logos" in different ways, but he claims that the "eternally misunderstood" *logos* of Fr.1, which is crucial to the metaphysical or linguistic interpretation of *logos*, is simply his account of things:

“The logos of Heraclitus is primarily the discourse of Heraclitus himself; though he may call it his ‘Word’.”<sup>12</sup> Philologists have pointed out that logos as a divine name or as the sense of Highest Reason is not found until the post-Aristotelian period,<sup>13</sup> and that the idea of a “world law” or “world reason” stems from Stoic philosophy. Their conclusion is that such a meaning cannot possibly be claimed for Heraclitus. So, the metaphysical interpretation of the logos has been rejected by many famous scholars, beginning with Diels and Burnet, and continuing through Nussbaum and Barnes.<sup>14</sup>

However, “logos” of Fr.1 would be something more, i.e., something universal, even eternal and divine (eontos aei *έόντος άει*), because “all things come to pass in accordance with this logos”.<sup>15</sup> When we think of his expression that men are unable to understand logos not only ‘once they have heard my discourse’ but *even before*, this sounds puzzling. How can they be expected to understand it in advance if it is only ‘what Heraclitus says?’ Thus the logos here cannot be not merely the words he utters or meaning of what he has to say.<sup>16</sup> Namely, it is not subjective meaning, but objective one. In other words, it is the cosmic principle, the truth, or real existence which determines the course of all things to come.

Also, we can find some evidence that logos had the sense of “world reason” before Heraclitus. For instance, Anaxagoras uses “logos” as the whole of the intellectual side, all that is thought, conceived, imagined, said, or merely alleged, against the factual reality.<sup>17</sup> Democritus seems to provide the earliest clear examples of this expanded generic meaning, “rationality,” too. The fragment 53 can hardly be translated without referring to “reason.”<sup>18</sup> Democritus thus gives us the stage where logos can be used on its own as

“reason.”

Moreover, there are another clues that logos is not only linguistically interpreted. In Fr.50, he says, “It is wise, listening not to me but to the logos, <and say> that all things are one.” (*οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστὶν ἐν πάντα εἶναι.*) Also, in Fr.72, he says: “The logos which orders all things.” (*λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι*) These fragments tell us that the logos is something which one hears and which regulates all events; a kind of universal law of becoming and something which exists independent of him. Here it is clear that logos is independent of Heraclitus and imply the conception of the world order as a meaningful language which one hears with more or less comprehension. The most important thing is to listen not to Heraclitus, but to the discourse within your soul, and it will tell you all.<sup>19</sup> After all, Heraclitus is a spokesman for the logos. His words are an attempt to make this universal principle noticeable to a few people among the many who seem deaf.<sup>20</sup>

Heraclitus explicitly reproaches people who fail to understand even before they have heard the logos, and such a reproach would make little sense unless the logos were something which could be apprehended by some faculty other than hearing. But in this case the logos cannot be just an account, therefore the logos of Fr.1 should be taken to have independent existence.<sup>21</sup>

As a result, we can say that logos cannot be interpreted only linguistically. His logos has some metaphysical meaning, “divine reason,” and expresses much more than his utterance.

## The logos and soul

Secondly, logos is deeply related with soul. In Fr. 45, Heraclitus says: “You will not find out the limits of the soul by going, even if you travel over every way, so deep is its logos” (*ψυχῆς πείρατα ἴδων οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει*).<sup>22</sup> Here, what is the deep logos which the soul “has,” and which explains our inability to find its end points? In this sentence, *logon echei logosn echei* should mean something like “it has something to say.” Now the possession of rational speech may be significant here, but this idea cannot explain the adjective “deep.” Most scholars have rightly assumed that logos in Fr.45 must mean “measure,” as in Fr.31B. The limitlessness of the psyche is then to be understood in terms of impenetrable depth. So the soul’s logos is “vast, subtle and deep”; and intelligence is required to find it out. Even if you travel around, you cannot find it. Heraclitus has discovered the unreachable “limits” or the interior depth of psyche, i.e., some new property of psyche.<sup>23</sup> As for this point, Snell has stated as follows:

In Heraclitus the image of depth is designed to throw light on the outstanding trait of the soul and its realm: that it has its own dimension, that it is not extended in space... In the last analysis Heraclitus means to assert that the soul, as contrasted with things physical, reaches into infinity.<sup>24</sup>

The logos so profound and limitless can scarcely be distinct from the universal logos, according to which all things come to pass. The solution to 45 thus gives us the fuller explanation for Fr.101: “I went in search of myself.” By seeking for his own self,

Heraclitus could find the identity of the universe.

Another reference to the logos of soul appears in Fr.115: "To the soul (psychē) belongs a report (logos) that increases itself. *ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὐξῶν*)." Diels-Kranz and other scholars consider this logos as "amount" or "measure" as in Fr.31: "Sea pours out <from earth>, and it measures up to the same amount (logos) as it was before becoming earth. *θάλασσα διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖτος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ.*") They think that the measure of the soul is much deeper than the proportion of the physical change such as water. However, according to C.H. Kahn, the self-augmenting power of the psyche is part of what is meant by the "deep logos" of the soul in 45.<sup>25</sup> This power of self-expansion is manifested in the exhalation or "boiling up" of heated vapor. Heraclitus seems to conceive the psychē as "something which increases like smoke within the breasts of men."<sup>26</sup> This expanding logos of the soul sounds quite different from measure of the sea.

### The logos and knowledge

As mentioned above, Heraclitus reproaches people who are ignorant of logos. Knowing how to listen to logos will enable one to speak intelligently. It is wise to speak in agreement with the universal logos. In this point, the logos has been seen to be something that exists and is true forever, exercises some regulatory function with respect to becoming, and is understood or apprehended only by persons who understand the unity of opposites.

Fr.1 also implies that failure to understand the logos results in the most dismal ignorance. Hence, failure to understand the logos results in an epistemic state that is both child-like and apparently



different from sleep.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, it is said that the logos of Heraclitus has something important to do with knowledge, and it is contrasted with ignorance. Hence it is possible that Fr.1 contains “a reference to the eternal complementarity of knowledge and ignorance or, more precisely, to the eternal complementarity of the (reliable) object of knowledge and its (unreliable) would-be subjects.”<sup>28</sup> It is safely said that Heraclitus intended to show a specific form of reasoning in connection with wisdom rather than to present a doctrine or “truth.”

Furthermore, in Fr.2, Heraclitus says that accurate perception of things and events is necessary for discovering the logos which underlies and explains them. He says: “Therefore it is necessary to follow the common; but although the logos is common the many live as though they had a private understanding.” Then, the senses are the primary channels of communication with the logos for human beings. Heraclitus doesn’t condemn sense perception like Parmenides. Yet, in other sayings, he states the limitations of the senses and abuses them. This probably means that mere seeing and hearing are precisely the activities of the many who cannot understand the truth.

Also, in Fr.2, Heraclitus points out the error of those who treat thinking as private, while the logos is common to them and to everything else. His contrast between “common” thinking and “private” thinking seems to have been an attempt to distinguish true knowledge—i.e., knowledge of the logos—from false opinion. He likens ignorance of the logos to being asleep. Therefore, knowledge of the logos should be like being “awake,” i.e., being in a state of conscious recognition.<sup>29</sup> According to Fr.72, “people are at odds with that with which they associate most constantly.” Since “that

with which they most constantly associate” must be the logos, “to be at odd with” must be synonymous with “to fail to recognize or understand the logos.”<sup>30</sup> Hence, in order to understand the logos, one must grasp genuine wisdom, i.e., what we ordinarily do not see and do not grasp.

### The nature of the logos

Thirdly, the nature of logos will be treated. As have seen above, since Heraclitus’ logos is said to be the universal principle, it could be the account which men listen to, the all-embracing truth, the rational account in the cosmic structure that makes all things one by gathering.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, this logos is expressed as “what is common to all.” This common logos is clearly shown in Fr.114: “Those who speak with sense must rely on what is common to all, as a city must rely on its law, and with much greater reliance; for all the laws of men are nourished by one law, the divine law; for it has as much power as it wishes and is sufficient for all and is still left over.” Here, “what is common to all” means something transcendent, divine law. On the contrary, other facts imply that the logos exists as a genuine constituent of the cosmos or corporeal thing. In several fragments, the logos is said or implied to be “*ξυνός*.” This word is an older form of “*κοινός*” and means “common” or “universal.”<sup>32</sup> The meanings ‘common’ and ‘universal’ suggest either that the logos is universally present in things or that it is universal in some other sense.<sup>33</sup> From his sayings, we can find that the logos is not only transcendent but also common. This expression seems contradictory. The logos becomes much complicated. However, for Heraclitus, this is not contradictory. Heraclitus describes the following things as

“common to all”; intelligence of insight, recognition of the truth to be guided by the divine logos which is present in all things and discovered by all people if only they will open their eyes and their minds to the fullest extent. Therefore, the logos is both human thought and the governing principle of the universe. This idea is like Pythagorean thought and appears in the Air of Anaximenes, which is at the same time the divine and living stuff of the universe and the element of soul and mind in us. Heraclitus’ logos also has a material embodiment. To sum them up, we can say this logos is universal and all-pervading, and it is the law by which the world is ordered, and which can be understandable in human minds and common to all.

The word would thus have dual meaning: the conventional meaning and something much more comprehensive and profound. However close the relation between the principle and its explanation is, they still remain two distinct things: something operating in the cosmos and its realization in thought and language. Since the logos is primarily conceived as being inherent in the things and outside human speech, it must be the object of the explanation.<sup>34</sup> This expresses the dual nature of logos. Thus, the concept of logos seems to involve subjective and objective aspects; it thus comprehends both the subjective activity and the objective result. In other words, one could say that the logos holds an intermediate position between the words and the things. Belonging to both, it unites them, as the disclosing realization of the matter in speech.<sup>35</sup> So this logos turns out to be mingling two ideas into one word.<sup>36</sup> In Heraclitus, there is no sharp distinction between words and things. “The logos is inherent in the things, — but not itself a “thing,” or engaged in

structuring things.”<sup>37</sup> The logos is an “immanent regulative agent.” It would appear to be literally mingled with the phenomena that it regulates. It can be said that this is “a logos about the logos.” Therefore, there can be little doubt that the role of the logos is to manage the interaction of opposites.

### The logos and fire

Finally, the relation between fire and logos must be mentioned, because fire plays an important role and is often identified with logos in Heraclitus. The word “fire” (*πῦρ*) first appears in Fr.30: “The ordering (kosmos), the same for all, no god nor man has made, but it ever was and is and will be: fire everliving, kindled in measures and in measures going out. (*κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ’ ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰείζων, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.*)” Here Heraclitus says that the whole world-order is an ever-living fire. This statement is apparently related with logos. It would be right to identify it with the logos since the Stoics and Hippolytus say that the fire of Heraclitus is “rational, responsible for the government of the whole world.”<sup>38</sup> We can also say that the material aspect of the logos is fire. The properties of fire, i.e., its light and brightness, its warmth and effect to change things illustrate that glow of wisdom which shines over the world.

Then the ever-living fire of the cosmos is being kindled (the present participle is used) and extinguished in measures. What does this mean? Heraclitus describes the cosmos in its present state. He probably states that the fire of the cosmos is being kindled in various parts of the world (becoming fire or hotter vapor), and

extinguished (becoming water or earth) within fixed measures keeping the balance of opposites if necessary for the universal order. Secondly, he shows that the simultaneous interaction of opposite forces tending in opposite directions influences the cosmos.

Moreover, in Fr.90, he states as follows: "All things are requital for fire, and fire for all things, as goods for gold and gold for goods." This expression shows that fire is the element which forms other substances, as in Anaximenes, by condensation and rarefaction. Heraclitus doesn't use the word "element" of fire, but he emphasizes the primacy of the fire. He must have the same idea as Anaximenes.

Fire is well suited to "embody" the universal law which is a law of change. This fire is the logos-fire, an "everliving fire," i.e., the principle of cosmic guidance which "steers all things." (Fr.64) The fire itself remains constant in all transformations and its measure is the same in all things. Fire here plays the role of justice. Since the cosmos is everliving, it exists always. The logos is also "forever" *ἀεί*; for the logos is a law of becoming of an eternal universe. If logos and fire are identical, fire is apparently eternal.

However, J.Wilcox points out that there can be found a little difference between logos and fire, even though the logos and fire could be identical. According to his statement, "there are important disanalogies in the ways that the *λόγος* and *πῦρ* are responsible for the unity of opposites, and in the ways they are said to be eternal and universally present."<sup>39</sup> Fire (*pyr*) is said to be "forever alive," while the logos simply "holds forever." The difference seems to be the one between something animate and something inanimate, or between two levels or kinds of animation. Furthermore, he mentions that *logos* and *pyr* do not unify opposites in the same way. As

noted above, *logos* unifies opposites by “gathering” them and managing them in some way, while *pyr* unifies pairs of opposites by underlying or constituting them. Finally, *logos* is almost identified with law, while *pyr* is merely said to behave in a lawlike way.<sup>40</sup> Also, *logos* is associated with formal or structural properties of matter, i.e., process and order, while *pyr* is associated with matter itself.<sup>41</sup> Here Wilcox stresses the complex aspect of *logos*. His analysis of *logos* and *pyr* seems plausible, but in any case, it is right to say that *logos* and *pyr* have a necessary connection and that both play the role of the cosmic principle, for both are equally “eternal,” and “steer all things.”

## Conclusion

As we have seen from above, Heraclitus' *logos* is the truth, the divine law of cosmos. At the same time, the *logos* is common to all. It means both something metaphysical and human thought, both inherent and external. This seems illogical, but for Heraclitus it would be natural to think of the divine principle as immanent as well as external. Namely, *logos* is the standard of change within cosmos which appears in physical form as cosmic fire. Further, it is rightly said that his words “*logos*,” “fire,” “wisdom,” and “soul” are closely related and mingled to express his intention.

Heraclitus seems to have been the first philosopher to elaborate with language. His subtle usage of words is difficult to understand. However, his intention is to let us know the intelligence, the insight, spiritual awareness and a light of self-disciplined activity through “*logos*.” Heraclitus seems to have searched for the truth and himself in his life. The statement, “I searched myself,” shows his way of

living. We can say that Heraclitus is outstanding as a philosopher, and that his dedication of all his life to “logos” leads us to the truth.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Volume I, “The Earlier Pre-Socratics and The Pythagoreans” (Cambridge University Press, 1967), p.411
- <sup>2</sup> In this paper, Diels-Kranz’ edition is used. Hermann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* vol. 1, ed. Walther Kranz (Berlin: Weidmann, 1974; reprint of 6th edition, 1951).
- <sup>3</sup> Charles H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.97
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>5</sup> Roman Dilcher, *Studies in Heraclitus* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms AG, 1995), p.34
- <sup>6</sup> Martin Heidegger points out this function in his *Sein und Zeit* § 7B: “λόγος als Rede besagt soviel wie δηλοῦν, offenbar machen das, wovon in der Rede ‘die Rede’ ist.”
- <sup>7</sup> Roman Dilcher, pp.32-33.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p.35
- <sup>9</sup> C. H. Kahn, p.97.
- <sup>10</sup> Both Aristotle and Sextus tell us this passage came at the beginning of the book. Here “logos” is translated “account.”
- <sup>11</sup> We can suppose that Heraclitus uses “logos” in one (or possibly both) of these senses in fragment 31b: “Sea pours out [from earth] and measures up to the same logos as there was before it became earth.” However, it is impossible that “logos” has an exclusively

linguistic sense. This fragment says something about the regular interchange of the elements. A universal logos would have to be there all along. It would have to be operative in this change and not merely function as measure into which the sea is counted. So it is not true that "proportion, proportionality" is the main aspect of logos, which determines all other meanings. Heraclitus' logos as a philosophical term, can by no means be restricted to this special usage as measure, i.e., the result or rational content of a calculation. Also, the meaning "proportion" is the rational content of an account of numbers, or the resulting relation of the things accounted for. Thus "ratio, proportion" is a quite specialized and restricted meaning.

<sup>12</sup> Joel Wilcox, *The Origins of Epistemology in Early Greek Thought* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1994), pp.59-60.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p.21.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p.57.

<sup>15</sup> The fact the logos "holds forever" guarantees that it is something divine: "Now 'being forever,' *eontos aei*, is a standard Homeric phrase for the immortal gods who are 'everlasting' or who 'live forever.'" (Kahn, pp.93-94.) If the logos is divine, it cannot be simply a true description of things.

<sup>16</sup> C. H. Kahn, p.98.

<sup>17</sup> R. Dilcher, p.39.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> C. Kahn, p.130.

<sup>20</sup> According to C. H. Kahn, Heraclitus' usage is so complicated and problematic that the logos infers much more. Heraclitus is not confined to the limits the everyday language imposes. Probably



at this time, many new concepts and ideas were developed. It is conceivable that he wanted to confront the reader with an unusual idea right from the beginning. However, he did not indicate that he was going to expound such a formula. He would be concerned with quite different matters, i.e., "human behavior," and not the structure of the cosmos. Although the universal law is operating everywhere, men remain blind before this apparent truth. This logos is universal, but it is said that at the same time this is an internal one. Namely, the incomprehension pertains to men's own life, and not to anything "outside." It is an intrinsic relation. Thus Kahn concludes that in this sentence the logos is related to human understanding and consciousness, and that the interpretation of "cosmic formula" is not enough to express its content.

<sup>21</sup> J. Wilcox, P.61.

<sup>22</sup> Charles H. Kahn translates this logos as "report."

<sup>23</sup> C. H. Kahn, p.129.

<sup>24</sup> Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind in Greek Philosophy and Literature* trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer, (Dover Publications, 1982; reprint of 1953 edition), p.17.

<sup>25</sup> C. H. Kahn, p.237.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> J. Wilcox., p.53.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p.52.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p.55.

<sup>30</sup> Similarly, Fr.56 asserts that "men are deceived in the recognition of what is obvious," and here "what is obvious" is surely the logos.

<sup>31</sup> "Logos" is derived from "lego." Etymologically, logos is something that "gathers." (J. Wilcox, p.63)

- <sup>32</sup> J. Wilcox, p.53.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>34</sup> R. Dilcher, p.32. Also, Kirk says: "The logos is that whose recognition constitutes real understanding." Kirk points out that logos refers not to "a type of understanding or apprehension," but to "an *object* of such a mental process." (G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge University Press, 1954, p.62)
- <sup>35</sup> It is the soul's internal discussion when investigating something.
- <sup>36</sup> R. Dilcher, p.30.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid., p.44.
- <sup>38</sup> W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, p.432.
- <sup>39</sup> J. Wilcox, p.71.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid.