

Context and Contextualism: Illocutionary acts of indicating and specifying the context

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1 Introduction

The present paper clarifies the concept of context commonly acknowledged in semantics and pragmatics, and then provides a different interpretation of context: the context is indicated and specified by the speaker's performance of an illocutionary act and the addressee's uptake/response. On the basis of this interpretation, we explain what the context is, and, while doing so, tackle some interpretational and ontological issues related to the notion of the context.

The commonly acknowledged concept of context is a particular context in which a sentence is uttered. The information of the context specifies (i) the referents of indexical/deictic expressions of the sentence, and (ii) the interpretation of a part or the whole of the sentence, i.e., the interpretation of what is said. If this interpretation of context is correct, then the aim of study of context is basically to describe (i) how idiosyncrasies of a particular context, such as the speaker, the hearer, the time and the place, provide the referents of indexical expressions, and (ii) how idiosyncrasies of a context as a particular communicative situation affect the interpretation of the sentence.

We provide a different interpretation of context: the context is a situation which is indicated and specified by the speaker's performance of an illocutionary act as a communicative move to the

addressee, to which the addressee reacts in one way or another. We also claim that specifying a particular illocutionary act involves specifying the characteristics of the context in this sense. That is, to specify the present act as a particular illocutionary act of commissive such as promising is, at least partially, to specify the circumstances in the present context as those of promising, and this specification might or might not be accepted by the addressee. If this hypothesis is correct, we can clarify at least some elements of the context by describing the circumstances specified by illocutionary acts.

We develop our argument in the following order. In the following section, Section 2, we clarify the well-acknowledged concept of context through examining the issue of context-sensitivity. We firstly discuss context-sensitivity in the sense that contextual information specifies the referents of indexical/deictic expressions, which contributes to the propositional/truth-conditional content of the sentence. Secondly, we discuss the context-sensitivity in the sense that contextual information specifies the interpretation of the sentence uttered. We then explain criticisms of contextualism by Cappelen and Lepore (2005), and clarify the sense of contextualism used by them. In Section 3, we propose a different interpretation of contextualism. We introduce what we call an "Austinian speech act theory" (Austin 1962a), which stands in opposition to standard speech act theory post-Austin (Searle 1969, 1975, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1989, Searle and Vanderveken 1985, and Back and Harnish 1979). Accordingly, we describe context and its elements specified by successful illocutionary acts. Contextualism in this sense is the doctrine that

describes how the speech situation is clarified or changed by the speaker's act, and what meaning is expressed in the clarified/changed speech situation. A short conclusion follows.

2 Context-sensitivity

2.1 Indeterminacy of the propositional content: indexical/deictic expressions

Context-sensitivity, a well-discussed issue of context, is generally interpreted as the issue of indeterminacy of the propositional/truth-conditional content of a sentence: the propositional/truth-conditional content of a sentence cannot be determined without some contextual information. Typical examples are in the following:

- (1) a. You, you, but not you, are dismissed,
- b. Not that one, idiot, that one. (Levinson 1983: 66)

To determine the propositional/truth-conditional content of a sentence with an indexical/deictic expression, such as 'you' and 'that', one has to specify a particular person/object referred to by the expression, and this is done by examining idiosyncrasies of the particular situation in which the sentence is uttered. To determine the propositional/truth-conditional content of the sentence in (1a), the referent of 'you', i.e., a particular person the speaker addresses in this situation, should be identified. Similarly, to determine the propositional content of the sentence in (1b), the salient object the speaker refers to by 'that' in this situation should be identified. This is based on the assumption that there is a particular speech

situation at a certain spatio-temporal location the speaker shares with the addressee, and, because of this sharing, the speaker can refer to a particular person/object or a particular time/place by an indexical/deictic expression. By 'you', the speaker refers to a particular person as the person she addresses, by 'that', the speaker refers to a particular object as a salient object which is not close to the speaker's location, and by 'now', the speaker refers to a particular time as the time of utterance, and so on. The example (1a) shows that the speaker can change the individual she addresses in a second, and the example (1b) shows it is possible that conversational participants sharing the speech situation misunderstand each other.

If context-sensitivity is interpreted in this way, determining the propositional/truth-conditional content of a sentence with an indexical/deictic expression is not essentially a syntactic-semantic process. Of course, as is shown by the distinction between 'I' and 'we', 'this' and 'that', and 'here' and 'there', a certain linguistic categorization is involved, but which person/object or time/location is referred to by an indexical/deictic expression is determined by idiosyncratic nature of the speech situation. Ian Smith, for example, is referred to by 'you' because he happens to be the person addressed by the speaker in this speech situation, and the lamp on the table is referred to by 'that' because it happens to be a salient object in this speech situation. That is, communication of this type is time-bound and space-bound. One cannot identify the referent of an indexical/deictic expression when s/he is away from the spatio-temporal location where the sentence is uttered.

The concept of context which is revealed by the discussion of context-sensitivity in this sense is a particular context: a particular

speech situation with all idiosyncrasies in which a sentence is uttered. Because of the idiosyncratic nature of the context, together with the linguistic invention of indexical/deictic expressions which refer to those idiosyncrasies, a specific meaning, which is particular to a certain context, is expressed. Without this idiosyncratic information, the person who is outside of this context cannot identify the truth-conditional content of the sentence. If this is all about context-sensitivity which concerns indexical/deictic expressions, it only shows a linguistic deficit: a sentence with an indexical/deictic expression does not or cannot express a complete proposition/truth-condition. Is this really true? We will come back to this point in Section 3.

2.2 Indeterminacy of the propositional/truth-conditional content: what is said

There is another sense of context-sensitivity. Consider the following examples:

- (2) a. I've had breakfast,
- b. You are not going to die. (Recanati 2004: 8)

According to Recanati (2004), when the speaker utters the sentence in (2a), she means more than the proposition that the speaker herself has had breakfast before the time of utterance. Similarly, when the speaker utters the sentence in (2b), she does not mean that the addressee will not die as if he is immortal. The speaker rather means something more specific. By uttering the sentence in (2a), the speaker means that she has had breakfast on that very day, and by

uttering the one in (2b), the speaker means that the addressee is not going to die from a particular injury or disease, say, from the cut. Recanati describes these specific propositions as actual truth-conditions, which contrast with literal truth-conditions. To explain the distinction between actual truth-conditions and literal truth-conditions, Recanati uses other examples as well such as "It's raining", "The table is covered with books", "John has three children" and "Everybody went to Paris" (Recanati 2004: 8). The one similar to the last example is discussed in Gauker (2003), which we explain next.

Gauker says that the following sentence expresses different propositions depending on different domains of discourse:

(3) Everyone is present. (Gauker 2003: 11)

According to Gauker (2003: 11-12), if the domain of discourse is students still enrolled in a course, the proposition expressed is the one that every student still enrolled in the course is present, and if the domain of discourse is students who have been attending recently, the proposition expressed is the one that every student who has been attending recently is present. Gauker (2003: 11-12) lists other types of context-sensitivity, some of which we discussed in the previous section of 2.1. The list includes indexical reference ("I am sick"), demonstrative reference ("That one is nice"), incompleteness ("Mary is too tired"), lexical ambiguity ("Right" as a response to the question "Should I turn left?"), logical ambiguity ("Every rhyme is not a poem") and grammatical ambiguity ("Hitchhikers may be escaping convicts").

Why are these described as cases of context-sensitivity? It is because in a certain situation the speaker and the addressee understand a more specific proposition than the literal truth-condition of the sentence uttered. Context in this sense is a particular situation in which the speaker and the addressee share the interpretation of which proposition is expressed. That is, we can hypothesize not only a speech situation in which the speaker and the addressee understand the meaning of constituent words of a sentence and their grammatical composition, i.e., a literal meaning of the sentence, but a speech situation in which the speaker and the addressee understand a more specific interpretation of the sentence, i.e., what is said. The speech situation in the latter sense is the situation in which the speaker and the addressee share the understanding of the present discourse, which include participants' roles, a topic and a purpose of communication, and assumptions about the present speech situation and the world.

How is this concept of context different from the one we discussed in the previous section, i.e., the context which specifies the referent of an indexical/deictic expression? Let us call, for convenience, the context which specifies the referent of an indexical/deictic expression the deictic context, and the context which specifies the interpretation of what is said the discourse context. The deictic context is a particular speech situation at a certain spatio-temporal location where the speaker and the addressee exist, and context-sensitivity of the deictic context means that idiosyncratic nature of this speech situation determines the content of the sentence uttered. The discourse context, on the other hand, is a particular communicative situation between the speaker and the

addressee, where a particular interpretation of the propositional/truth-conditional content of a sentence is given. Context-sensitivity of the discourse context means that communicative circumstances of a particular speech situation determine the interpretation of the sentence uttered.

Contextualism is a label given to the doctrine which accepts the discourse context in this sense, and supports the idea that communicative circumstances of a particular speech situation specify the interpretation of the propositional/truth-conditional content of a sentence: the interpretation of what is said (Recanati 2004 and Back 1994; also as explicature in Relevance Theory, Sperber & Wilson 1995 and Carston 2002). The contextualism in this sense is called into question by Cappelen and Lepore (2005). We discuss their criticism in the following section.

2.3 Criticism of contextualism: Cappelen and Lepore (2005)

Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 1) present a list of expressions which Kaplan (1989: 489) calls indexicals. The list includes the personal pronouns 'I', 'you', 'she', 'it' in their various cases and number, the demonstrative pronouns 'that' and 'this' in their various cases and number, the adverbs 'here', 'there', 'now', 'today', 'yesterday', 'tomorrow', 'ago' (as in "He left two days ago"), 'hence(forth)' (as in "There will be no talking henceforth"), and the adjectives 'actual' and 'present'. Cappelen and Lepore add to the list words and aspects of words that indicate tense, and contextuals which include common nouns like 'enemy', 'outsider', 'foreigner', 'alien', 'immigrant', 'friend', and 'native', as well as common adjectives like 'foreign', 'local', 'domestic', 'national', 'imported', and 'exported' (cf., Vallee 2003;

Nunberg 1992; Condoravdi and Gawron 1995; Partee 1989). They call this set of expressions the Basic Set of Context-Sensitive Expressions, and, according to them, it is the set of genuinely context-sensitive expressions.

Cappelen and Lepore recognize only a few context-sensitive expressions, i.e., those in the Basic Set of Context-Sensitive Expressions, and acknowledge a very limited effect of the context of utterance on the semantic content. They claim that all semantic context-sensitivity is grammatically (i.e., syntactically and morphemically) triggered, and that, beyond fixing the semantic value of these obviously context-sensitive expressions, the context of utterance has no effect on the proposition semantically expressed. They call these principles of analysis as Semantic Minimalism (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 2-3).

Semantic Minimalism is complemented by what they call Speech Act Pluralism. It is summarized as follows:

No one thing is said (or asserted, or claimed, or ...) by any utterance: rather, indefinitely many propositions are said, asserted, claimed, stated. What is said (asserted, claimed, etc.) depends on a wide range of facts other than the proposition semantically expressed. It depends on a potentially indefinite number of features of the context of utterance and of the context of those who report on (or think about) what was said by the utterance (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 4).

As proponents of Semantic Minimalism, Cappelen and Lepore

criticize what they call Radical Contextualism (RC), which supports the idea that every single expression is context-sensitive, and also what they call Moderate Contextualism (MC), whose proponents claim many expressions which are not included in the Basic Set of Context-Sensitive Expressions are context-sensitive. Cappelen and Lepore take the following strategy to dispute these contextualisms. They claim (i) any argument for MC inevitably slips into an argument for RC (Chapter 3-6), and that (ii) RC is empirically flawed, and ultimately incoherent (Chapter 7-9). They conclude that, since MC collapses into RC, MC also is both empirically flawed and ultimately incoherent. We briefly discuss the major points of their arguments concerning (i) and (ii).

Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 40) take the Moderate Contextualist argument for context-sensitivity as the claim that what is said by utterance *u* of sentence *S* containing context-sensitive expression *e* need not be the same as what is said by another utterance *u'* of *S*. Cappelen and Lepore then claim that a context-sensitivity argument can be provided for any sentence whatsoever, and consequently for any expression. They use the following sentence to show that the utterance of a sentence without any context-sensitive expression can be interpreted differently depending on the context:

(4) That's a dangerous dog. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 46)

An utterance *u* of sentence (4) in one context is true only if the dog is aggressive and initiates acts that put people in danger; another utterance *u'* of the sentence (4) in another context, where the dog has a viral disease, is true only if the dog can have detrimental

consequences; and another utterance u" of the sentence (4) in another context, where a group of people toss dead dogs at each other, is true if the dead dog is heavy and stiff and, hence, harmful.

Cappelen and Lepore also criticize the Moderate Contextualist argument for incompleteness. Consider the following example:

(5) Steel isn't strong enough. (Back 1994: 268)

Back (1994: 269) says that unless sentence (5) is completed by adding a propositional component that specifies what steel is strong enough for, all we have is a propositional fragment, or what Back calls a propositional radical. If so, Cappelen and Lepore claim, the following sentence is also incomplete:

(6) John went to the gym. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 64)

Although this sentence does not have any context-sensitive expression, it is incomplete because "we can ask: went to the gym how? Walked to the vicinity? Did something in the gym? Did what in the gym? For how long? What if he went into the gym but was sleepwalking? Etc." (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 64-65)

Making these points, Cappelen and Lepore show that a perfectly ordinary, non-indexical sentence can be context-sensitive and incomplete in the same sense in which Moderate Contextualists use these terms of "context-sensitive" and "incomplete" in their arguments. This strongly indicates that any sentence and any expression are potentially context-sensitive and incomplete, which is the claim Radical Contextualists make. That is, the arguments

for MC slip into arguments for RC. The target of Cappelen and Lepore's criticism is now RC.

First, Cappelen and Lepore say that only expressions in the Basic Set of Context-Sensitive Expressions pass context-sensitivity tests. As one of those tests, they discuss inter-contextual disquotational indirect reports: a context-sensitive expression typically blocks this type of report. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 88) Consider the following example:

- (7) a. Utterance made by George Bush, June 3, 2003: "I wasn't ready yesterday",
- b. Utterance made by Lepore, June 5, 2003: "Bush said that I wasn't ready yesterday". (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 89)

Lepore's report in (7b) is false because his use of 'I' and 'yesterday' fails to pick out the same person and day Bush picked out using these words. This is because these words are context-sensitive, and pick out the person and the day which are relative to the context in which they are used. In (7a) 'I' is the speaker of the utterance made by George Bush, i.e., George Bush, and, in (7b), 'I' is the speaker of the utterance made by Ernie Lepore, i.e., Ernie Lepore, although the subject of the main clause is Bush.

Imagine the sentence, "John is ready", is uttered in two different contexts. Context 1: in a conversation about exam preparation, someone raises the question of whether John is well prepared, and Nina says, "John is ready". Context 2: three people are about to leave an apartment; they are getting dressed for heavy rain, and

Nina says, "John is ready". This sentence does not block an inter-contextual disquotational indirect report. In saying "Nina said that John is ready", you can report these two utterances made by Nina: you report on her utterance in C1, and on her utterance in C2.

- (8) a. Nina said that John is ready,
 - b. Nina said that John is ready,
 - c. In both C1 and C2, Nina said that John is ready.
- (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 91)

According to Cappelen and Lepore, these examples show that 'ready' is not a context-sensitive expression because its interpretation is not affected in inter-contextual disquotational indirect reports. 'I' and 'yesterday' and others in the Basic Set of Context-Sensitive Expressions would take a wrong referent in inter-contextual disquotational indirect reports.

As another indicator of context-sensitivity, Cappelen and Lepore (2004: 105) observe that *e* is context-sensitive only if there are (or can be) false utterances of "S" even though S¹. Imagine the situation where I refer to a French woman, Silvie, and say "She is French", and someone, say, John, mistakenly refers to a Japanese woman, Anna, and says "She is French". One of the utterances of

1 Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 105-106) give the following examples:
(1) There is (or can be) a false utterance of "She is French" even though she is French.
(2) There is a false utterance of "That's nice" even though that's nice [said pointing at Al's car].
(3) There is a false utterance of "I'm hungry" even though I am hungry.

the sentence "She is French" is false (since Anna is Japanese, not French), even though she is French (because I refer to Silvie, and she is French). This test shows that there are two distinct contexts for uttering "She is French", and in one context a proposition that Silvie is French is expressed and it is true, while in another context a different proposition that Anna is French is expressed and it is false. That is, there are two distinct contexts for uttering the sentence, where two different propositions/truth-conditions are expressed: the sentence has two distinct truth values.

Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 107) call the Storytelling Context the context in which a Context Shifting Argument (CSA) is told, and the Target Context the context about which a CSA is told. They claim that a sentence with an indexical expression included in the Basic Set is used in its Storytelling. Imagine, for example, in a Storytelling Context X, I tell (i) a story about Target Context 1, where I make a true statement that she, Silvie, is French, and (ii) a story about Target Context 2, where John makes a false statement that she, Anna, is French. In the Storytelling Context X, I use the word "she" to refer to two different individuals, Silvie in Target Context 1, and Anna in Target Context 2, and utter the sentence to express two distinctive propositions, Silvie is French, which is true, and Anna is French, which is false.

According to Cappelen and Lepore, the sentences the Contextualists utilize in their context-sensitivity argument are not used. Imagine Storytelling Context Y, where two Target Contexts for uttering the sentence in (9) are explained: Target Context 1, where I refer to Osama bin Laden and say that he is tall for a Saudi Arabian, and Target Context 2, where John refers to Osama bin

Laden and says that he is tall for an NBS basketball player.

(9) Osama bin Laden is tall.

According to Cappelen and Lepore, Contextualists are trying to make us believe the utterance of the sentence (9) in Target Context 1 is true because Osama bin Laden is tall for a Saudi Arabian, while the utterance of the sentence (9) in the Target Context 2 is false because he is not tall for an NBA player. However, Cappelen and Lepore claim, when these utterances are explained in the Storytelling Context Y, the sentence "Osama bin Laden is tall" is not used with two distinct senses, i.e., "Osama bin Laden is tall for a Saudi Arabian" and "Osama bin Laden is tall for an NBA player". That is, when I tell stories of Target Context 1 and 2 in the Storytelling Context Y, I do not use the sentence (9) while differentiating the sense of "tall for a Saudi Arabian" from the one of "tall for an NBA player"; so I do not express different propositions. On the basis of this analysis, Cappelen and Lepore claim that two utterances of the sentence, "Osama bin Laden is tall", do not express two distinct propositions depending on the topic of conversation, i.e., the topic of the height of Saudi Arabians, or that of the height of NBA players. They, therefore, conclude that 'tall' is not a context-sensitive expression.

Another objection to Radical Contextualism is, according to Cappelen and Lepore, is that it makes communication impossible:

The objection we raise... is certainly not original with us; its variations go back at least to Frege. The simple idea is this: If RC were true, it would be miraculous if people ever

succeeded in communicating across diverse contexts of utterance. But there are no miracles; people do succeed in communicating across diverse contexts of utterance with boring regularity. So RC isn't true. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 123)

Every context is different and, if, as Radical Contextualists claim, every expression is context-sensitive, it is very difficult to imagine how people communicate with each other. Radical Contextualists have to explain how people succeed in doing this.

In the following section, we discuss how we should take Cappelen and Lepore's objections to Contextualisms.

2.4 A reply to Cappelen and Lepore's objections to Contextualisms

First of all let us examine the sense of sentence meaning in which Cappelen and Lepore develop their arguments against Contextualisms. Since they advocate Speech Act Pluralism, which complements Semantic Minimalism, it is unlikely that they discuss the sense of a sentence uttered as an illocutionary act. We, however, need a scrutiny.

In the discussion of inter-contextual disquotational indirect report, Cappelen and Lepore say Nina's utterances of "John is ready" in two contexts, one in the discussion of the exam preparation (Context 1), and the other in the discussion of the preparation for going out (Context 2), can be reported by "Nina said that John is ready" despite of the difference in context. If we interpret Nina's utterances of "John is ready" as illocutionary acts, however, they are reported differently depending on the context. If Nina says, "John

is ready" in Context 2, where uncertainty of John's joining is raised, you can report Nina's utterance by saying "Nina said (or asserted) that John is coming". However, when you report Nina's utterance "John is ready" in the discussion of the exam preparation in Context 2, obviously you cannot report it by saying "Nina said (or asserted) that John is coming".

Cappelen and Lepore claim that when two utterances of "Osama bin Laden is tall", one in the discussion of the height of Saudi Arabians and the other in the discussion of the height of NBA players, are explained in the Storytelling Context, the sentence "Osama bin Laden is tall" is not used with two distinct senses, i.e., "Osama bin Laden is tall for a Saudi Arabian" and "Osama bin Laden is tall for an NBA player". When the sentence is uttered as an illocutionary act, however, the sentence with a specific sense can be explained in the Storytelling Context. Imagine Target Context 1, where Nina says "John is tall" in the discussion of the possibility of hiring him as a police officer². The illocutionary act performed is a verdictive, which "consist[s] in the delivering of a finding, official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact, so far as these are distinguishable." (Austin 1962a: 153) That is, Nina, in uttering "John is tall" in this circumstance, asserts an evidence for hiring John, i.e., John is tall for a police officer. In Storytelling Context Z, I can explain Nina's utterance of "John is tall" in Target Context 1 in saying "According to Nina, John is tall and will be a good police officer", in which I definitely use the word "tall" in the sense of "tall for police officers".

² I appreciate Yuji Nishiyama's useful comment concerning this point.

These show that Cappelen and Lepore's analyses do not apply to meanings of sentences when they are used as illocutionary acts. So let us assume that their analyses are based on sentence meaning in a locutionary sense: in particular, a 'rhetic' act, rather than a 'phonetic' or 'phatic' act. Austin explains the distinction among these three locutionary acts as follows:

... to say anything is

- (A. a) always to perform the act of uttering certain noises (a 'phonetic' act), and the utterance is a phone;
- (A. b) always to perform the act of uttering certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, in a certain construction, i.e. conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar, with a certain intonation, &c. This act we may call a 'phatic' act, and the utterance which it is the act of uttering a 'pheme' (as distinct from the phememe of linguistic theory); and
- (A. c) generally to perform the act of using that pheme or its constituents with a certain more or less definite 'sense' and a more or less definite 'reference' (which together are equivalent to 'meaning'). This act we may call a 'rhetic' act, and the utterance which it is the act of uttering a 'rHEME'. (Austin 1962a: 92-93)

Nina's utterances of "John is ready" in two contexts can be reported

by "Nina said that John is ready", when the utterances are taken as rhetic acts. The problem with rhetic acts, however, is that sense and reference are only "more or less definite". Austin says:

... the rhetic act is the one we report, in the case of assertions, by saying 'He said that the cat was on the mat', 'He said he would go', 'He said I was to go' (his words were 'You are to go'). This is the so-called 'indirect speech'. If the sense or reference is not being taken as clear, then the whole or part is to be in quotation marks. Thus I might say: 'He said I was to go to "the minister", but he did not say which minister' or 'I said that he was behaving badly and he replied that "the higher you get the fewer"'. (Austin 1962a: 96-97)

When a less definite sense is allowed for the word "ready", Nina's utterances of "John is ready" in two contexts can be reported as "Nina said that John is ready (on both occasions)". However, when a more specific sense of the word "ready" is required, these utterances are reported as "Nina said that (on one occasion) John is ready for the exam and (on another occasion) John is ready to go out", rather than being reported by the same sentence, "Nina said that John is ready".

Imagine, as a similar case, you overheard Nina saying "John is ready" on two different occasions. Not knowing which individual was referred to by "John" in each case, you might be able to report them by saying, "Nina said that John was ready (on both occasions)" or "Nina said that 'John' was ready (on both occasions)"³. This is possible if a far less definite reference of the word 'John' is allowed.

This does not guarantee, however, that one and the same semantic content is expressed by "John is ready" on both occasions.

Let us think again of two utterances of "Osama bin Laden is tall": one in the discussion of the height of Saudi Arabians and the other in the discussion of the height of NBA players. Because of the nature of a rhetic act, it is questionable if you should report those utterances by saying "He said that Osama bin Laden is 'tall' (in both cases), but I didn't know what he meant by 'tall' (in each case)", just as you say "He said John was at the 'bank' (in both cases), but I didn't know what he meant by 'bank' (in each case)". In this interpretation, a rigid sense of "tall" is required even for a rhetic act, and its absence is marked by quotation marks. Taking the sense of the word "tall" much less rigidly, you might report those utterances by saying "He said that Osama bin Laden is tall (in both cases)". Both the sentence with the rigid sense and the one with the less rigid sense seem to express a meaning. We are happy to say the sentence (9), which we cite here again, expresses a meaning both when it means that Osama bin Laden is tall as a Saudi Arabian, and when it means that Osama bin Laden is tall without specifying the sense of "tall":

(9) Osama bin Laden is tall.

Having this in mind, let us move on to the discussion of Cappelen and Lepore's objections to RC (Radical Contextualism). In the

3 This point was made by Marina Sbisà during the discussion in One-day Workshop on Contextualism at Fuji Women's University in 2006.

preceding section, we explained two points. The first point is that expressions other than those included in the Basic Set of Context-Sensitive Expressions do not pass context-sensitivity tests. The second point is that if, as Radical Contextualists claim, every expression is context-sensitive, it is difficult to imagine how people succeed in communicating with each other, despite the fact that they actually do.

Firstly, Cappelen and Lepore claim that alleged context-sensitive expressions, such as 'ready' or 'tall', do not seem to pass context-sensitivity tests, while context-sensitive expressions included in the Basic Set of Context-Sensitive Expressions do. However, as we discussed above, Cappelen and Lepore build their arguments assuming that the semantic content of a sentence is the meaning expressed when the sentence is uttered as a rhetic act, where a less rigid sense and a less specific reference are allowed. Therefore, if we interpret the semantic content of a sentence differently, such as the meaning expressed by the utterance as (i) an illocutionary act or (ii) a rhetic act with a rigid sense and a specific reference, their arguments do not apply.

For example, the context-sensitivity arguments of the sentences in (2) do apply when they are interpreted as an illocutionary act. When asked if she is hungry, in uttering the sentence in (2a), the speaker declines, as a behabitive⁴ illocutionary act, the offer of food. This makes applicable the interpretation of the sentence meaning that the speaker has had breakfast on that day. Imagine,

4 Austin (1962a: 160) says "Behabitives include the notion of reaction to other people's behaviour and fortunes and of attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone else's past conduct or imminent conduct".

similarly, that in uttering the sentence in (2b), the speaker expresses, as a verdictive⁵ illocutionary act, her judgment that the cut/injury is not serious. This makes possible the interpretation of the sentence meaning that the addressee is not going to die from the cut/injury.

- (2) a. I've had breakfast,
b. You are not going to die. (Recanati 2004: 8–10)

It is also possible to assume the semantic context of a sentence as the meaning expressed when the sentence is uttered as a rhetic act in which a rigid sense and a specific reference are required. When the speaker utters the following sentence,

- (10) Here's a red one (apple), (Bezuidenhout 2002: 107)

the semantic content might be taken as "Here's an apple which has red flesh" rather than "Here is an apple with a red skin" (Bezuidenhout 2002: 107)⁶.

Another related point is that, since Cappelen and Lepore take the semantic content of a sentence in a restricted sense, they take its

⁵ Austin (1962a: 153).

⁶ It is also possible to interpret the semantic context of this sentence as the meaning expressed by the utterance as an illocutionary act. In the situation where the speaker sorts through a barrel of apples to find those that have been afflicted by a fungal disease which stains the flesh of the apple red, in uttering the sentence, the speaker performs a verdictive illocutionary act: the speaker expresses her judgment that here is, or she has found, an apple which has been afflicted by the disease and has red flesh. See Bezuidenhout (2002: 107).

context-sensitivity in a restricted sense as well. However, as we explained in Section 2.2, there are two different concepts of context, the deictic context and the discourse context, and also two senses of context-sensitivity which correspond to either concept of context. Let us explain again and elaborate these two concepts of context and corresponding senses of context-sensitivity.

The deictic context is a particular speech situation at a certain spatio-temporal location where the speaker and the addressee exist, and context-sensitivity of the deictic context means that the idiosyncratic nature of this speech situation determines the content of the sentence uttered. For example, since Ian Smith happens to be a person addressed in a particular speech situation, the referent of the pronoun 'you' is Ian Smith. In other words, since the speaker shares with the addressee a certain spatio-temporal location, she specifies (i) a certain person relative to her/his speech role in the present speech situation, such as the speaker, the hearer, or the third person, (ii) a certain object relative to its salience in the present speech situation, and (iii) a certain time/place relative to the spatio-temporal location of the present speech situation. The context change in this sense means the change of the spatio-temporal location where communication takes place. So, if the propositional/truth conditional content of the sentence includes one of these elements of the deictic context, such as participants and their roles, salient objects, and the physical/temporal location, then the propositional content changes considerably from one deictic context to another. This is one sense of context-sensitivity.

The discourse context is a particular communicative situation between the speaker and the addressee, which is a purely

communicative situation, and characteristics of this situation, which include the topic and goal of communication, and shared assumptions, shape what the speaker says. For example, imagine the discourse context between a university lecturer and students in her lecture course, where the attendance of the students who have been attending the class recently counts (since, say, the students who are still enrolled but haven't attended recently are those who have lost interest in the course and decided to drop out). When the lecturer says "Everyone is present" in this discourse context, 'everyone' refers to every student who has been attending regularly, and the proposition expressed is the one that every student who has been attending recently is present. That is, since the speaker shares with the addressees a particular communicative situation, she expresses what she wants to say in a way that is clear and specific enough for the purpose of the present communication.

The context change in this sense means that, because the goal or topic of communication or one of the assumptions in the present communicative situation changes, what the speaker wants to say takes a different form, i.e., it is expressed by a different sentence, or what the speaker says has a different content. Let us think of the following scenario. The lecturer who says "Everyone is present" to her students meets later a departmental secretary who tries to identify dropouts or dropouts-to-be. When the secretary asks the lecturer about the attendance of the students in her course, the lecturer, who understands the secretary's purpose of asking the question, says, "Not everyone was present. Alice wasn't there. Actually she attended the first couple of lectures and hasn't come since then". Although the lecturer says "Everyone is present" and,

later says "Not everyone was present", she does not have a contradictory belief. In the first discourse context, the lecturer refers to every student who has been attending recently by 'everyone', and expresses the proposition that every student who has been attending recently is present. This is because, in this discourse context, the importance is whether or not everyone who should be present is present, excluding those who have seemingly dropped out. In the second discourse context, on the other hand, the lecturer refers to every student who is still enrolled as 'everyone', and expresses the proposition that not every student who is enrolled is present. This is because, in this discourse context, the important thing is whether or not there are any students who are enrolled but do not attend the course (and have dropped out or are likely to drop out). A specific interpretation of a part or the whole of the sentence is given in a particular discourse context because of its communicative nature, and, therefore, in a different discourse context, a certain interpretation is not valid or another interpretation is given. This is another sense of context-sensitivity.

If there are two types of context, i.e., the deictic context and the discourse context, and, correspondingly, two senses of context-sensitivity, it is not surprising that these two senses of context-sensitivity are rather different, and, therefore, discourse-context-sensitive expressions do not pass the sensitivity tests which deictic-context-sensitive expressions do. It is, however, an important question why these rather different situations are described as a context, and how these types of context are related. We will try to give an answer to these questions in Section 3.

Another criticism to Contextualisms made by Cappelen and

Lepore is that if, as Radical Contextualists claim, every expression is context-sensitive, it is difficult to imagine how people succeed in communicating with each other, as they actually do. This is an important criticism of contextualism. This is basically the issue of explaining the nature of communication by sign: how is it possible to communicate meanings by means of signs, whose use is not the same each time? If the criticism is interpreted this way, however, Cappelen and Lepore's Speech Act Pluralism is subject to the same criticism. We cite here again their idea of Speech Act Pluralism:

No one thing is said (or asserted, or claimed, or ...) by any utterance: rather, indefinitely many propositions are said, asserted, claimed, stated. What is said (asserted, claimed, etc.) depends on a wide range of facts other than the proposition semantically expressed. It depends on a potentially indefinite number of features of the context of utterance and of the context of those who report on (or think about) what was said by the utterance. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 4)

If Cappelen and Lepore's claim about Speech Act Pluralism is right, how do people succeed in communicating with each other? If what is said, asserted, or claimed depends on a potentially indefinite number of features of the context, how can the speaker and the addressee know what is said? Cappelen and Lepore criticise Contextualisms by saying:

The simple idea is this: If RC were true, it would be miraculous if people ever succeeded in communicating across diverse contexts of utterance. But there are no miracles; people do succeed in communicating across diverse contexts of utterance with boring regularity. So, RC isn't true. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 123)

We can, however, equally criticize Cappelen and Lepore by saying, "If Speech Act Pluralism were right, it would be miraculous if people ever succeed in communicating in the context whose features are potentially indefinite". We try to tackle this problem of communication by analysing the two kinds of context from an interactive perspective.

Cappelen and Lepore clarify a rather limited concept of context from a rather limited perspective: a speech situation at a particular spatio-temporal location that specifies the person, object, time, and place to which indexical/deictic expressions refer. The context in this sense, the deictic context, exists as a background of uttering a sentence, and its information specifies the propositional/truth-conditional content of the sentence. To see the context in this way is to see it as a feeding context: the context feeds indexical/deictic expressions with referents.

It is also true that we say what we say in the way we say it because we interpret the speech situation where we are: who we speak to, what topic we are communicating about, what is the purpose of the present communication, and so on. The context in this sense, the discourse context, is the situation with particular communicative characteristics, which affects what we say. This

discourse context can be seen as a feeding context: the context feeds an utterance with an interpretation. This idea, however, causes a serious problem of interpretation. Since we grasp the nature of the present discourse context only heuristically, it is difficult to explain how we know what is said by the utterance.

A less problematic concept for the discourse context is a breeding context: the discourse context breeds an interpretation or interpretations. When a speaker utters something to a particular addressee in a particular speech situation, the speaker has some assumptions about how her/his utterance is taken by the addressee on the basis of discourse-contextual elements: who the addressee is, what topic the speaker and the addressee are communicating about, and what the purpose of the present communication is. There are different discourse contexts which give different interpretations to the one and the same utterance. For example, in one discourse context, the speaker's utterance is taken as a mere suggestion to the addressee because of the social superiority of the addressee, and, in another, it is taken as strong advice to the addressee because of the speaker's expertise.

If there are two kinds of context, i.e., the deictic context, which is a spatio-temporal location where a particular speaker utters a sentence to a particular addressee, and the discourse context, which guarantees a certain interpretation of the utterance, successful communication is the case in which the speaker and the addressee share, in the deictic context, a discourse context which breeds a certain interpretation of the utterance. If so, language must be equipped with a mechanism by which the speaker indicates, and specifies or insinuates the discourse context that breeds a particular

interpretation of the utterance. A performative formula (Austin 1962a) seems to be a prototypical case of communication in this sense. We develop this idea in the following section.

3 Explicit performatives and two kinds of context

3.1 Austin and contextualism

In this section, we clarify the two kinds of context and explain communication by describing the process by which an explicit performative sentence is uttered and a corresponding illocutionary act is performed. Before doing so, we discuss Austin's speech act theory and Austinian contextualism.

Austin's speech act theory (Austin 1962a) makes a clear contrast with the standard speech act theory proposed thereafter, which is based on intentionality (Searle 1969, 1975, 1976, 1979, 1983, and 1989, Searle and Vanderveken 1985, and Back and Harnish 1979). Sbisà (2001) summarizes the standard speech act theory as follows:

Since Searle (1969: 46–49), the illocutionary act has generally been conceived as the act a speaker successfully performs when, uttering a sentence with a certain intention in certain circumstances, he or she gets the hearer to understand his or her intention. The speaker's communicative intention determines what illocutionary act he or she should be taken to perform and therefore what illocutionary force his or her utterance may have. (Sbisà 2001: 1795)

While the standard speech act theory purports to explain how the

speaker's communicative intention is expressed and communicated, Austin's speech act theory purports to explain linguistic actions as "the total speech act in the total speech situation" (Austin 1962a: 148). Recently Austin's legacy has been re-evaluated by Sbisà: Sbisà (2001) examines Austin's concept of illocutionary effects and, in using them, develops a theoretical framework in which mitigation phenomena are explained; Sbisà (2006) re-evaluates the importance of locutionary acts, which have been replaced by utterance acts (in Searle 1969), and shows the possibility of describing a linguistic action without relying on propositions. Oishi (2007) also re-analyzes Austin's felicity conditions and clarifies the elements of the context by describing felicitous and infelicitous performances of illocutionary acts.

Cappelen and Lepore (2005) call Austin a Radical Contextualist. However, it isn't accurate to say Austin is a Radical Contextualist in the sense that Cappelen and Lepore (2005) use the term. Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 32) give the following excerpt from Austin (1962b) to show Austin is a Radical Contextualist:

If you just take a bunch of sentences...impeccably formulated in some language or other, there can be no question of sorting them out into those that are true and those that are false; for . . . the question of truth and falsehood does not turn only on what a sentence is, nor yet on what it means, but on, speaking very broadly, the circumstances in which it is uttered. Sentences are not as such either true or false. (Austin 1962b: 110-11)

This, however, seems only to show that sentences themselves cannot be either true or false as statements are. The same point is made in another work by Austin:

...it is a fashionable mistake to take as primary '(The sentence) "S" is true (in the English language)'. Here the addition of the words 'in the English language' serves to emphasize that 'sentence' is not being used as equivalent to 'statement', so that it precisely is not what can be true or false. (Austin 1961: 121)

However, if Austin's theory is a kind of contextualism, what kind of contextualism can it be? We would like to claim that in his version of contextualism Austin establishes a special relationship between an utterance and the context. The speaker expresses a particular meaning by uttering a sentence, while indicating the present speech situation, i.e., the deictic context, as a context in which the utterance is interpreted in a particular way. For example, to communicate something by uttering a declarative sentence is not only to describe a certain state of affairs, but also to indicate the deictic context as a discourse context in which describing the state of affairs in that way is interpreted as, say, a warning. Austin (1962a) says:

It has come to be seen that many specially perplexing words embedded in apparently descriptive statements do not serve to indicate some specially odd additional feature in the reality reported, but to indicate (not to report) the

circumstances in which the statement is made or reservations to which it is subject or the way in which it is to be taken and the like. To overlook these possibilities in the way once common is called the 'descriptive' fallacy
(Austin 1962a: 3)

To communicate then is at least partially to indicate, in the deictic context, a discourse context in which describing a state of affairs in a certain way is interpreted in a particular way, say, performing a certain illocutionary act with a certain strength. We see a prototype of this type of communication in illocutionary acts performed by explicit performatives, which we discuss in the following section.

3.2 Explicit performatives and two kinds of context

Explicit performatives have a unique position in speech act theory. Although, in Austin (1962a), they are prototypical examples for clarifying the concept of speech acts, the standard intention-based speech act theory does not explain them satisfactorily. The following are Austin's original examples of explicit performatives:

- (E. a) 'I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)'- as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.
- (E. b) 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth'- as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem.
- (E. c) 'I give and bequeath my watch to my brother'- as occurring in a will.
- (E. d) 'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.' (Austin 1962a: 5)

Austin says:

In these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing, or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it. (Austin 1962a: 6, emphasis in text)

Searle, on the other hand, describes how performatives work as follows:

We found that it was impossible to derive the performative from the assertion because the assertion by itself wasn't sufficient to guarantee the presence of the intention in question. The difference between the assertion that you promise and the making of a promise is that in the making of a promise you have to intend your utterance as a promise, and there is no way that an assertion by itself can guarantee the presence of that intention. (Searle 2001[1989]: 105)

As a solution to this problem, Searle says:

The solution to the problem came when we saw that the self-guaranteeing character of these actions derives from the fact that not only are these utterances self-referential, but they are self-referential to a verb which contains the notion of an intention as part of its meaning, and the act in question can be performed by manifesting the intention to perform

them. (Searle 2001[1989]: 105)

This explanation still falls short of explaining how performatives work. When I say "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth" in the appropriate circumstances, I certainly name the ship (and the ship has been named and it is the Queen Elizabeth), rather than just manifesting my intention of naming the ship. This is the whole point of explicit performatives. There is a great gulf between doing something and manifesting the intention of doing it.

Another problem with this explanation is that it is not clear whose intention one is manifesting. Searle says, "they [performative utterances] are self-referential to a verb which contains the notion of an intention as part of meaning", but the performative sentences cannot have an intention to perform the act. The only possible interpretation is that, by uttering a performative sentence, the speaker manifests her intention to perform the act. If so, there isn't much difference between performative utterances and non-performative utterances: in uttering a performative sentence, the speaker manifests her intention to perform an illocutionary act, while, in uttering a non-performative sentence, the speaker expresses her intention to perform an illocutionary act by way of saying something, as Searle explains by means of the concept of indirect speech acts (Searle 1975).

A different explanation can be given for the mechanism of how performatives work. In uttering an explicit performative, the speaker indicates and specifies the present speech situation through specifying the present communicative move, i.e., the present illocutionary act. For example, in uttering the sentence, "I name

this ship the Queen Elizabeth", the speaker indicates the present speech situation and specifies it as the speech situation of naming. The present speech situation is a situation in a particular spatio-temporal location in which a particular speaker and a particular addressee exist, that is, the deictic context in our sense. The speech situation specified by explicit performatives is the discourse context. In uttering the sentence, "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth", the speaker indicates the deictic context in which she addresses a particular addressee or addressees, and specifies it as the discourse context of naming. So, when the illocutionary act of naming is successful, not only the act is counted as naming, i.e., the ship in question is named the Queen Elizabeth, but also the discourse context is defined as that of naming.

The deictic context is indicated by means of deictic expressions such as 'I', 'you', and 'this'. In referring to a particular person by 'I' or 'you', a particular spatio-temporal situation where the person is the present speaker or the present addressee, i.e., the deictic context, is indicated. Through referring to a particular object by 'this', a particular spatio-temporal situation where the object is identified as an object which is close to the speaker, i.e., the deictic context, is indirectly indicated. The deictic context is also indicated by 'hereby': a communicative move, i.e., an illocutionary act, is referred to by 'hereby', and a situation in a particular spatio-temporal location where the move/act takes place, i.e., the deictic context, is indicated.

Explicit performatives are interesting cases because expressing a meaning, that is, specifying the present act, and specifying the discourse context which guarantees the meaning/act occur at the

same time in one utterance. In other utterances, specifying or insinuating a certain discourse context occurs by way of, say, describing a certain state of affairs in a certain way. For example, by saying "You are a damn fool", the speaker indicates the discourse context of insulting.

In the following section, we will explain what elements the context consists of.

3.3 Illocutionary acts and the discourse context

In the former section, we said that to perform an illocutionary act is to indicate the deictic context and to specify it as a certain discourse context. We have to explain the sense of "specify" before we go into the discussion of the context.

When we focus on illocutionary acts performed by explicit performatives, especially so-called institutional ones, to utter a performative sentence in the appropriate circumstances itself seems to perform an illocutionary act. For example, to utter the sentence "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth" in the appropriate circumstances is in itself to perform the act of naming. However, if it is the case, it is puzzling how uttering the sentence "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth", that is, uttering a certain string of words structured by grammatical rules in English, has such power to name the ship. Austin discusses this point (Austin 1962a: 9-10), and, to explain how performatives work, he, on the one hand, describes appropriate circumstances for performing an act, i.e., the felicity conditions (Austin 1962a: 13-38), and, on the other hand, clarifies the sense of performing a speech act by distinguishing illocutionary acts from locutionary and perlocutionary acts (Austin 1962a: 91-151).

The power of performing an act can be explained by the interaction between the speaker who makes a communicative move (to the addressee) of indicating the deictic context and specifying it as a certain discourse context, and the addressee who makes a reciprocal move (to the speaker) of accepting the discourse context in the deictic context. That is, in specifying the present utterance as an illocutionary act of naming or promising, the speaker specifies the deictic context as the discourse context of naming or promising, and, when this move is accepted as such by the addressee, the deictic context has become the discourse context specified, which accompanies certain conventional effects. So, when we say that the speaker specifies the deictic context as a certain discourse context, we do not mean that the speaker unilaterally creates a certain discourse context: illocutionary acts are (or fail to be) understood, agreed, and completed by the addressee, and, as a result, the conventional effects are (or fail to be) achieved. That is, a certain discourse context is identified and agreed by the speaker and the addressee in the deictic context, where the communicative value of the present utterance is fixed, associated conventional effects are achieved, and communicative moves to follow are expected. This is the source of power of the illocutionary act.

In analyzing illocutionary effects, Sbisà (2001) explains an interactive aspect of performing an illocutionary act in Austin's model. Sbisà (2001) says that the illocutionary act is associated with three different kinds of effect:

- (i) The securing of uptake,
- (ii) The production of a conventional effect,

- (iii) The inviting of a response or sequel.

These effects are explained as follows:

Effect (i) amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning and the force of the utterance and, unless it is achieved, the illocutionary act is not actually carried out. Effect (ii) amounts to the bringing about of a state of affairs in a way different from bringing about a change in the natural course of events: the act of naming a ship 'Queen Elizabeth' makes it the case that this is the ship's name, and that referring to it by any other name will be out of order, but these are not changes in the natural course of events. Effect (iii) amounts to inviting a certain kind of subsequent behavior; if the invitation is accepted, a certain further act by some of the participants follow. (Sbisà 2001: 1796)

These three kinds of effects can be interpreted in terms of the process by which the present utterance, which specifies the deictic context as a certain discourse context, is understood by the addressee (effect (i)), and the deictic context has become the discourse context specified, and corresponding conventional effects are achieved (effect (ii)), and the specified context causes a further communicative move (effect (iii)).

Let us briefly discuss the elements of the context. Austin's felicity conditions give us a general picture of how an illocutionary act can be felicitous/infelicitous. As I discussed elsewhere (Oishi 2007), the ways in which an illocutionary act becomes felicitous/

infelicitous seem to show elements of the context. That is, if, as we claim, to perform an illocutionary act is to indicate the present speech situation and specify it as a particular discourse context, then the ways in which such an attempt becomes inappropriate show how specifying the deictic context as a certain discourse context fails, which seems to show in turn the elements of the context specified.

Let us look at Austin's felicity conditions:

- (A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,
 - (A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.
 - (B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and
 - (B.2) completely.
 - (.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further
 - (.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.
- (Austin 1962a:14-15)

Violations of the conditions (A.1) and (A.2) are described as 'misinvocations', in which the purported act is disallowed (Austin 1962a: 18). The felicity conditions (A) seem to describe elements of the discourse context in which a certain act is allowed. The felicity condition (A.1) shows the element of the discourse context in which the speaker and the addressee share linguistic and socio-cultural conventions according to which to utter certain words in certain circumstances by certain persons is counted as performing a certain speech act, which accompanies a certain conventional effect. The felicity condition (A.2) shows another element of the discourse context in which there are persons and circumstances specified by linguistic and socio-cultural conventions.

Violations of the second type of condition in (B.1) and (B.2) are described as 'misexecutions', in which a purported act is vitiated (Austin 1962a: 18). That is, the felicity conditions (B) seem to describe the elements of the deictic context in which a certain act is actually executed by the speaker's performance and the addressee's response. The felicity condition in (B.1) describes the element in which the speaker actually utters something to construct the event of performing a particular act. That is, the speaker creates a performance as an illocutionary act in the deictic context. The felicity condition in (B.2) exposes another aspect of the deictic context, in which the speaker's performance is completed by the addressee's performance as a response.

A violation of the felicity conditions (.1) and (.2) is described as an 'abuse', in which the professed act is hollow (Austin 1962a: 18). The felicity conditions () seem to describe the elements of

specifying the deictic context: the speaker is responsible for specifying the deictic context as a certain discourse context, and indicates a certain thought/feeling/intention as her own (.1), and, when applicable, commits herself to conducting a certain action subsequently (.2)⁷.

So, when the speaker successfully performs a certain illocutionary act by uttering a sentence, the utterance is a linguistic artefact created in the deictic context. This is one sense of context-sensitivity, i.e., deictic-context-sensitivity. The utterance is also evaluated in term of linguistic and socio-cultural conventions and associated persons and circumstances. This is another sense of context-sensitivity, i.e., discourse-context-sensitivity. In other words, through the specification of the present illocutionary act, two aspects of the context of communication are recognized. One is the deictic context, i.e., a speech situation in a particular spatio-temporal location, where the present speaker makes a communicative move to the present addressee in uttering something. Austin's felicity conditions (B) indicate this aspect of context. The other aspect is the discourse context, by which the communicative move in the deictic context is interpreted. Austin's felicity conditions (A) indicate this aspect of context. Austin also describes another aspect of communication by the felicity conditions (): the speaker expresses a certain thought/feeling/intention and a commitment as her own.

4 Conclusion

In the present paper we have clarified two different concepts of

⁷ For detailed discussion, see Oishi (2007).

context, that is, the deictic context and the discourse context, and specified two separate senses of context-sensitivity. We defined the deictic context as the speech situation in a certain spatio-temporal location. Deictic-context-sensitivity means, in its narrow sense, that, when the determination of the propositional content of the sentence involves the specification of the referents of indexical expressions, such as 'I', 'you', 'here', and 'now', the referents of the indexical expressions vary from one speech situation to another. The discourse context, on the other hand, is defined as the speech situation with communicative characteristics which specifies/guarantees how the utterance is interpreted. Discourse-context-sensitivity means, in its narrow sense, that the specific interpretation valid in one type of speech situation is not valid in other types of speech situation.

We discussed Cappelen and Lepore's (2005) criticism of Contextualism in terms of two points. The first point concerns the fact that two senses of context-sensitivity are rather different kinds, and the second point concerns the possibility/impossibility of communication: if every expression is context-sensitive, how do people ever succeed in communicating with each other? To answer this question, we described, using explicit performatives as prototypical cases, the communicative mechanism of specifying a meaning through specifying the present communicative move. That is, the speaker specifies the meaning she expresses while indicating the deictic context and specifying it as a certain discourse context.

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